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Abstract
Distracting sensory events can capture attention, interfering with the performance of the task at hand. We asked: is our 
attention captured by such events if we cause them ourselves? To examine this, we employed a visual search task with an 
additional salient singleton distractor, where the distractor was predictable either by the participant’s own (motor) action or by 
an endogenous cue; accordingly, the task was designed to isolate the influence of motor and non-motor predictive processes. 
We found both types of prediction, cue- and action-based, to attenuate the interference of the distractor—which is at odds 
with the “attentional white bear” hypothesis, which states that prediction of distracting stimuli mandatorily directs attention 
towards them. Further, there was no difference between the two types of prediction. We suggest this pattern of results may be 
better explained by theories postulating general predictive mechanisms, such as the framework of predictive processing, as 
compared to accounts proposing a special role of action–effect prediction, such as theories based on optimal motor control. 
However, rather than permitting a definitive decision between competing theories, our study highlights a number of open 
questions, to be answered by these theories, with regard to how exogenous attention is influenced by predictions deriving 
from the environment versus our own actions.
Introduction
Perceptual processing to perform a task often faces inter-
ference from various kinds of distracting stimuli. A clas-
sic example is that when we are searching for some visual 
target, a task-irrelevant but salient distractor interferes with 
(e.g., slows) search performance—a phenomenon referred to 
as involuntary ‘attentional capture’ (e.g., Hickey, McDonald, 
& Theeuwes, 2006; Theeuwes, 1992; Theeuwes, Atchley, & 
Kramer, 2000; Yantis, 1993). There has been considerable 
debate as to whether and how such capture events may be 
reduced (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Christ & Abrams, 2006; 
Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Müller, Geyer, Zehetleitner, & Krum-
menacher, 2009; Müller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003; 
Theeuwes, 2010; Wykowska & Schubö, 2010, 2011). One 
possible way for top-down processes to modulate bottom-up 
capture may be based on predictive information regarding 
aspects of the distracting stimuli.
Attentional white bear? Predicting 
the irrelevant item
Conceivably, knowing about the location or defining 
feature(s) of a distracting item might help ignore it; though, 
paradoxically, attention might also be especially drawn to 
this item, increasing its distracting effect. The latter effect 
has actually been reported in the literature (Huffman, Rajsic, 
& Pratt, 2017; Lahav, Makovski, & Tsal, 2012; Tsal & 
Makovski, 2006) and termed ‘attentional white-bear’ phe-
nomenon (AWB; Tsal and colleagues) or ‘ironic capture’ 
(Huffman and colleagues). Tsal and colleagues argued that 
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the first item selected is likely to be the distractor, in part 
because the very instruction to ignore the distractor will rep-
resent it, as a kind of ‘template’, in visual working memory 
(vWM), biasing the allocation of attention towards a dis-
tractor appearing in the display—in the same way as trying 
not to think about a white bear makes one focus on its very 
mental image.
Recent explorations of the AWB or ‘ironic-capture’ 
hypothesis have yielded conflicting findings. Several stud-
ies reported that providing various kinds of information 
about the distractor (e.g., its defining feature to be held in 
vWM) increased attentional capture (Beck, Luck, & Hol-
lingworth, 2011; Olivers, 2009), whereas other studies found 
participants to be able to use distractor features to reduce 
capture (Arita, Carlisle, & Woodman, 2012; Dhawan, Deu-
bel, & Jonikaitis, 2013; Woodman & Luck, 2007). In addi-
tion, while even task-irrelevant symbolic spatial cues can 
give rise to attentional orienting (Hommel, Pratt, Colzato, 
& Godijn, 2001), predicting the location of a distractor by 
means of presenting participants with an advance spatial 
cue, or as a result of statistical learning, has been reported 
to be beneficial to performance (Chao, 2010; Munneke, 
Van der Stigchel, & Theeuwes, 2008; Ruff & Driver, 2006; 
Sauter, Liesefeld, Zehetleitner, & Müller, 2018). Others, by 
contrast, have failed to find suppression of distractor loca-
tions in response to spatial cues (Buckolz, Guy, Khan, & 
Lawrence, 2006).
Prediction by action
In almost all studies on this issue thus far, predictive infor-
mation about the distractor was ‘external’ in nature, for 
instance, in the form of an explicit spatial cue indicating the 
distractor location. A neglected, though at least as impor-
tant source of predictions about upcoming sensory events, 
are our own actions (Waszak, Cardoso-Leite, & Hughes, 
2012): throughout our lives, we learn which sensory out-
comes result from motor actions we perform. Compared to 
external cues, actions are generally thought to involve spe-
cific predictive information: information that enables us to 
distinguish self- from environment-produced effects, thus 
contributing to a sense of agency and a rudimentary sense of 
self (Gallagher, 2000). Accordingly, it would be reasonable 
to expect that predictability of the sensory consequences 
of actions can be utilized to better guide attention to task-
relevant target and away from distracting stimuli (e.g., when 
honking the horn of a car, we do not get distracted by the 
horn’s sound because we caused it ourselves). However, lit-
tle is known as yet about the specific impact of action–effect 
prediction on visuo-spatial attention and the mechanisms 
involved.
It is generally thought that action-based predictions 
attenuate the strength of the actions’ sensory consequences: 
a phenomenon that has been called ‘sensory attenuation’ 
(Waszak et al., 2012; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). A para-
digmatic case in point is that we find it hard to experience 
the sensation of being tickled when we ourselves control a 
robotic arm that does the tickling, whereas we have more of 
a feeling of being tickled if a temporal delay or trajectory 
perturbation is introduced into the motion of the robotic arm 
(Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999). While sensory attenu-
ation has also been demonstrated in the auditory domain 
(Baess, Horváth, Jacobsen, & Schröger, 2011; Hughes, 
Desantis, & Waszak, 2013; Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bos-
bach, 2011), there is a paucity of literature as regards the 
visual domain. A study by Cardoso-Leite and colleagues 
reported a decrease in sensitivity for self-produced visual 
stimuli (action-related prediction), compared to stimuli pre-
dicted by auditory tones (accompanied by a non-predictive 
action) (Cardoso-Leite, Mamassian, Schütz-Bosbach, & 
Waszak, 2010).
Traditionally, explanations of sensory attenuation are 
based on the optimal motor control theory (Blakemore et al., 
1999; Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). These explanations posit 
that when we act, an efference copy of the motor command 
enters a forward model, which predicts the sensory con-
sequences of the action (e.g., a salient distractor) and this 
prediction (corollary discharge) is then compared with (and 
subtracted from) the actual sensory consequence, attenuating 
its strength. A distractor predicted by an action should thus 
produce less interference compared to a non-predicted dis-
tractor or a distractor predicted solely by external events, or 
cues, which would not enter the forward model in the same 
way. There is another group of theories relating to the notion 
of predictive processing which attempts to explain sensory 
attenuation in a more general way (Brown, Adams, Parees, 
Edwards, & Friston, 2013; Clark, 2013; Friston, 2011; 
Pickering & Clark, 2014; Van Doorn, Hohwy, & Symmons, 
2014), which will be discussed later, see the “Discussion” 
section.
Aim of study
On this background, the present study was designed to exam-
ine two related questions: First, would predictability of a 
highly salient but task-irrelevant visual stimulus through 
participants’ own actions increase or decrease the inter-
ference it generates under conditions of ‘efficient’ visual 
search, that is, when both the target and the distractor ‘pop 
out’ and, thus, strongly compete for selection? Second, can 
the effects of prediction be attributed to motor-related pre-
diction processes (rather than, e.g., a more general prediction 
process)?
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Design
To investigate these questions, we adopted a commonly 
used paradigm for investigating the influence of salient 
distractors: visual search for a salient singleton target 
with an additional, irrelevant salient singleton (i.e., the 
distractor) in the display. The task required participants 
to respond to a non-defining feature of the singleton tar-
get (the so-called ‘compound’ search task, cf. Duncan, 
1985). Using this paradigm, we manipulated the (joint) 
predictability of distractor presence and location in three 
conditions: baseline (no prediction), cue prediction, and 
action prediction.
As pointed out by Hughes et al. (2013), many studies 
investigating the influence of action-driven prediction on 
perception might actually be confounded, because compared 
to the usual control conditions, the participants’ action did 
not just predict the identity of the resulting stimulus (specific 
configuration and properties of items) but it also allowed for 
temporal prediction as to when the stimulus would appear, 
that is, temporal control over the (onset of the) stimulus. 
Furthermore, the mere presence of an action might influence 
cognitive processes other than those related to action–effect 
prediction. Finally, people may use predictive strategies that 
do not rely on the motor information, such as simply using 
the knowledge that certain effects usually follow certain 
actions. Given all this, we devised our conditions such as to 
carefully control for these confounds (Table 1). Compared 
to the baseline, our cue prediction condition was designed 
to isolate only the specific influence of the predictive infor-
mation conveyed by the cue—that is, “non-motor identity 
prediction” processes in the terminology of Hughes et al. 
(2013). And our action prediction condition, when compared 
to the cue prediction condition, was designed to isolate only 
the specific influence of what Hughes et al. (2013) refer to 
as “motor identity prediction” processes, such as the forward 
model processes, which were the main focus of our study. To 
control for “temporal prediction” and “temporal control” as 
well as the mere presence of action, the same actions were 
used to trigger the stimuli in all three conditions; however, 
only in the action prediction condition were the actions pre-
dictive as to the presence and location of a distractor.
In the action prediction condition, the sensorimotor 
contingencies between action and stimulus were arbitrary. 
This meant they had to be learned by the participants in an 
‘association phase’ that directly preceded the action predic-
tion condition proper (Herwig & Waszak, 2012; Richters 
& Eskew, 2009), through repeated coupling of an action (a 
‘cause’: a button press with the left or the right hand) with a 
stimulus (an ‘effect’, distractor presented at one of two spa-
tial locations). This necessitated constraints on the order in 
which the three prediction conditions could be administered, 
specifically: the other two (i.e., baseline and cue prediction 
conditions) could not be performed after participants had 
acquired this association (after the action prediction condi-
tion), because—for the reasons outlined above—the very 
same actions (button presses with the left/right hand, though 
not coupled with particular distractor effects) were used in 
those conditions as well. Given this, performing these condi-
tions after the action–effect learning would have confounded 
the results. Therefore, we presented the three conditions in a 
fixed, sequential manner (see below). Note that encounter-
ing distractors in mere practice trials before performing the 
visual search experiment proper already helps participants 
reduce the interference caused by the distractors (Müller 
et al., 2009). Given this, since prior exposure to the distrac-
tor stimuli was an inherent part of the association phase in 
the action prediction condition (distractors had to be shown 
to be associated with the actions participants performed), 
this factor also needed to be controlled for in the other 
two conditions—namely, by simply introducing distractor 
exposure phases prior to the baseline and the cue prediction 
conditions. The order of phases and conditions was thus as 
follows: exposure phase → baseline condition → exposure 
phase → cue prediction condition → association phase → 
action prediction condition.
To avoid interference of the response required by the task 
(compound task requiring a two-alternative choice response 
to the critical target property) with the learned action–effect 
associations, we adopted the same procedure as Cardoso-
Leite et al. (2010) in all conditions: following the search 
display, two alternative response options were presented 
alternately on the screen (one at a time) until the participant 
stopped the alternation by issuing a neutral action (using 
Table 1  Contrasts between the 
prediction processes involved 
in the baseline, action and cue 
prediction conditions; based on 
Hughes et al. (2013)
Condition or contrast type Temporal pre-
diction
Temporal 
control
Non-motor identity 
prediction
Motor 
identity 
prediction
(B)aseline * *
(C)ue * * *
(A)ction * * * *
Contrast (C)–(B) *
Contrast (A)–(C) *
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both hands at the same time to press a button, thereby select-
ing one of the response options; see also Fig. 1). Given that 
this response procedure does not allow for speeded reac-
tions required for measuring reaction times (RTs), only per-
formance accuracy was available as dependent variable in 
Experiment 1.
Of note, distractor interference has been hitherto most reli-
ably observed in terms of slowed RTs (Theeuwes, 1992; Yan-
tis, 1993). Nevertheless, assuming that the RT cost generated 
by the distractor originates from the process of visual selec-
tion (rather than from, e.g., response selection), presenting 
the search display only briefly (threshold duration determined 
by a staircase procedure) and terminating its exposure by 
presenting post-display masks would make it less likely for 
the target to be processed if attention had first been captured 
by the distractor on a fraction of trials (Zehetleitner, Koch, 
Goschy, & Müller, 2013). Consistent with this, Kiss, Grubert, 
Petersen, and Eimer (2012) reported increased error rates 
owing to distractor presence in displays presented for 200 ms 
(though no masks were used in their paradigm). On the other 
hand, using a similar paradigm but with search displays pre-
sented for only 86 ms and then masked, Gibson and Jiang 
(1998) failed to find a significant cost in accuracy—their only 
dependent measure. However, this is likely attributable to 
the fact that their search task was very ‘inefficient’, requiring 
serial scanning of display items.
Given that demonstrating distractor interference with 
short presentation times has proved difficult in the past, we 
created conditions of strong overall distractor interference—
thus making it more likely for interference to be reflected in 
performance accuracy. Specifically, in the compound search 
task employed, the target-defining feature was an odd-one-
out shape, while the response was to be made with respect 
to the orientation of a line probe inside the target shape. 
Defining the target as a singleton shape was expected to 
increase participants’ reliance on a ‘singleton search’ strat-
egy, under which the interference from singleton distractors 
is assumed to be maximal (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Lamy & 
Egeth, 2003). The irrelevant singleton was made more salient 
than the target by virtue of its increased luminance—based 
on the assumption that sensory attenuation can more easily 
influence the perceived intensity of stimulus compared to, 
for instance, its perceived shape or color (luminance varies 
along a single ‘dimension’, so it may be easier to ‘subtract’ 
some luminance; shape or color, by contrast, are complex 
dimensions, so that one cannot ‘subtract’ in the same way). In 
addition, we used dense displays with both target and distrac-
tor completely surrounded by neutral, ‘non-target’ items to 
further increase the salience of the singleton distractor (Ran-
gelov, Müller, & Zehetleitner, 2013, 2017). The distractor 
could appear at only one of two possible locations, so that we 
could associate these two locations with two different actions.
Experiment 1
Methods
Participants
Because the task was rather difficult, data collection was 
ongoing until we had usable datasets from 30 participants. 
Fig. 1  Basic trial sequence. Each trial began with a fixation cross (or 
a cue, in the cue prediction) displayed until the participant pressed the 
left, right, or neutral key. This triggered the presentation of the search 
display, which was shown for a duration previously determined by a 
staircase procedure and then masked. Next, participants responded by 
selecting the target probe orientation (i.e., the orientation of the line 
inside the cut-off grey square) from two alternating response options, 
by pressing the neutral key with both hands
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The criterion for this was defined a priori as accuracy above 
chance level in each combination of predictive condition and 
distractor presence. Overall, 44 participants were tested, but 
14 failed to meet this criterion. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of two action–effect contingency groups 
(described below), with 15 participants in each group. The 
number of participants was based on the expected effect size 
that action prediction should have on top of cue prediction 
according to theories invoking action–effect prediction via 
forward models. To our knowledge, there is only one study 
comparable in its aim and design (Cardoso-Leite et al., 
2010), based on which we estimated the effect size as dz = 
0.5461. To detect an effect of such size with a reasonable 
power of at least 0.80 in a within-participants design, we 
would need to test 29 participants. Because we use a sub-
division into two groups of participants, we decided for a 
sample size of 30 participants.
Participants’ age range was 19–34 (M = 24.6) years; all 
of them were right-handed, and nine were male. All partici-
pants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They 
were paid € 8 per hour or opted to receive a course credit. 
The experiments were conducted at the Experimental Psy-
chology Laboratory of the LMU Munich. All experimental 
procedures consisted of purely behavioral data collection 
with healthy adult participants and did not involve any 
invasive or potentially dangerous methods. The study was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the LMU Psychology 
Department, in accordance with the Code of Ethics of the 
World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data 
were stored and analyzed anonymously. All participants pro-
vided written, informed consent.
Apparatus and stimuli
Participants were seated in a dimly lit and sound-attenuated 
room, in front of a CRT monitor (LaCie Electron 21/108, 
screen refresh rate 100 Hz, screen resolution 1024 × 768 pix-
els) at a viewing distance of 58 cm (maintained using a chin 
rest). A standard keyboard was used to collect responses. 
Participants were instructed to use their left middle finger to 
press the C key (left response key), the right middle finger 
to press M key (right response key), and to press the space-
bar always using both index fingers at the same time for a 
neutral response.
The E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools Inc., 
Sharpsburg, PA, version 2.0 Professional) was used to set 
up and present the stimuli. The search display consisted of 
20 gray square items (size 1.05° × 1.05° of visual angle, 
luminance 13.3 cd/m2, RGB [64, 64, 64]) against a black 
background (luminance 1.24 cd/m2); the items were posi-
tioned around three (imaginary) concentric circles (equally 
spaced, outer diameter 11.7°) with a gray fixation cross in 
the center. In the search displays, one of the items (the tar-
get) had one of the four corners cut off. On some trials, 
a bright gray square (a distractor) was present [luminance 
58.4 cd/m2, RGB (160, 160, 164)]. Additionally, each of 
the items contained a probe: a black line (size 0.6 × 0.1°) 
oriented either vertically or horizontally. The target and 
the distractor were limited to locations on the middle circle 
(diameter 7.2°). Pattern masks were presented at the end of 
display exposure. The masks consisted of a black-line cross 
and a diamond inside a square (to mask probe lines as well 
as the contour line produced by cutting off one corner of the 
target stimulus) and was of the same color and luminance as 
the distractor (see Fig. 1 for a depiction).
General procedure
The experiment consisted, essentially, of the three blocked 
conditions: baseline, cue prediction, and action prediction, 
in which participants performed a variation of essentially 
the same task; this task will be described first, followed by 
the specific differences among the three conditions and other 
details.
Visual search task
Each trial began with a gray fixation cross in the center of the 
screen. Participants could then, at any time, press a key—
which, after a delay of 100 ms, produced the search display 
(Fig. 1). Each item in the display contained a line probe 
oriented randomly in either vertical or horizontal direc-
tion. Participants’ task was to search for a shape singleton 
(target)—a square with a random corner cut off—and report 
the orientation of the line inside this shape. The target could 
appear at one of the six locations on the middle circle, twice 
as likely at the top and bottom locations, relative to the lat-
eral positions. (This specific ratio was chosen to allow for a 
comparison with a planned ERP study, which would require 
such a ratio of midline and lateral target occurrences.) In 
one-half of the trials, a luminance distractor was randomly 
displayed at either the top-left or bottom-right location. Par-
ticipants were instructed to ignore the distractor. The search 
display was presented only for a brief period of time, deter-
mined individually by a pre-experimental staircase proce-
dure (M = 227 ms, SD = 83). The display was then masked 
for 250 ms. Next, the response options “horizontal line?” 
and “vertical line?”, with a picture of the respective line 
orientation, were presented alternately on the screen (800 ms 
1 Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) reported a significant sensitivity reduc-
tion when the stimuli were predicted by an action  (dz = 0.793) but 
not when they were predicted by a tone  (dz = 0.247). Although both 
effects were investigated in two different groups of participants (of 
unequal size), we estimated the additional effect of action prediction 
on top of cue prediction as the difference between these two effects 
 (dz = 0.546).
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per option) until the participant selected one option by press-
ing the neutral key using both hands (the selected option 
was the one displayed when the neutral key was pressed). 
Feedback was provided in the case of an incorrect response 
(in the form of a red “minus” sign presented for 1000 ms). 
Afterwards, a blank screen was displayed for an inter-trial 
interval (ITI) of 250–550 ms (uniform random distribution).
Participants were asked to press one of three different 
keys to initiate each trial: the left, the right, or the neutral 
key. They were instructed to choose among the keys at will, 
but to press the neutral key about twice as often as the other 
keys, optimally in a ratio of 25%:25%:50%. In the baseline 
and cue prediction conditions, which key was selected had 
no implication on the task. Making participants perform the 
initial key-press action in the above ratio served two pur-
poses: learning this ratio for the action prediction condition 
and equating the cognitive demands and level of alertness 
and preparedness for the upcoming trial among all three con-
ditions. In the cue prediction condition, the fixation cross at 
the start of a trial was replaced by a central symbolic cue, 
either a left arrow (<) sign, indicating that the distractor 
would be displayed at the top-left location; or a right arrow 
(>) sign, indicating a distractor at the bottom-right loca-
tion; or a minus (–) sign, indicating that no distractor would 
be presented. The cue was displayed until a participant ini-
tiated a trial with a button press, and it was 100% valid. 
Participants were explicitly informed about this and told to 
use the information provided by the cue in any way that 
could help them perform the task better. In the action pre-
diction condition, the key used to start the trial determined 
the presence and location of the distractor. The neutral key 
produced no distractor, while the left and right keys would 
produce a distractor at one of the two usual (i.e., the top-left 
or bottom-right) locations. This action–effect contingency 
was counterbalanced across participants (between-partici-
pants factor “contingency group”: natural mapping versus 
inverse mapping): for one-half of the participants, the left 
key would produce the distractor at the top-left position and 
the right key the distractor at the bottom-right position, and 
vice versa for the other half. Participants were also explicitly 
informed about this.
There were six blocks of trials in each of the three condi-
tions, each block consisting of 32 trials, yielding a total of 
192 trials per condition. After each block, participants were 
given a feedback about their key press ratio and allowed to 
rest for a while.
Association task
The action prediction condition was preceded by an asso-
ciation phase, to permit participants to learn the sensori-
motor contingencies between an action (button press) and 
the observed effect (display with a distractor) prior to 
performing the action prediction condition proper. The task 
in the association phase was to randomly press the left or 
the right key—in a ratio of approximately 50%:50%, at a 
pace of about one press every two seconds—while an empty 
screen with just a fixation cross was displayed. The key press 
produced (after a delay of 100 ms) a display that was similar 
to the search display in the search task proper, except that 
it always contained a distractor singleton, but no target, and 
there were no probe lines inside the items. The distractor 
appeared at one of the two possible locations, according to 
the participant’s contingency group. The duration of this 
display was 600 ms. To ensure that participants payed atten-
tion to these displays, the central fixation cross was red in 
one-eighth of the trials. On such catch trials, participants 
were required to immediately press the neutral key with both 
their index fingers at the same time. The response window 
for the catch trials was 1000 ms. In case of an incorrect 
response or a failure to respond, a red “minus” sign would 
appear for 1000 ms.
There were seven blocks of trials, each block consisting 
of 64 trials, that is, 448 association trials in total. The num-
ber of association trials was chosen based on the Cardoso-
Leite et al. (2010) study. After each block, participants were 
given feedback about their key press ratio and allowed to 
rest.
Exposure task
An exposure phase was administered before both the base-
line and the cue prediction conditions. This phase was the 
same as the association phase, but instead of participants 
starting the trials with a button press, the displays appeared 
on their own after 600 ms. There were six blocks of exposure 
trials, each block consisting of 64 trials, that is, 384 exposure 
trials in total.
Staircase
Before the actual experiment, the search display durations 
were determined individually for each participant. An adap-
tive staircase procedure was used to find the individual 
thresholds. The visual search task described above was used; 
however, only the neutral key was used to start the trials and 
a distractor was always present, located randomly at any of 
the six locations on the middle circle. The search display 
duration started at a set value of 400 ms and was increased 
by one step size in case of an error and decreased by one 
step size in case of two successive correct responses. This 
staircase rule aimed at an accuracy threshold of approxi-
mately 71%. Step size was 80 ms until the 4th reversal point 
(error after a correct response or vice versa), 40 ms until the 
6th reversal, and then kept at 10 ms. The procedure termi-
nated after 16 reversals, and the final display duration was 
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calculated as the average duration across the last 10 reversal 
points, rounded to a multiple of ten.
Overall structure of the experiment
Participants began with the staircase phase to establish the 
display duration to be used in a subsequent practice phase. 
This practice phase had the same structure as the actual 
experiment but was limited to two blocks of eight trials per 
each of the six experimental phases. After practice, partici-
pants performed the staircase procedure once more, and the 
value obtained was introduced in the actual experiment. 
After the experiment, a one-question “questionnaire” was 
administered asking participants: In what way did you use 
the information provided by the cue? The whole experiment 
took between 1.5 and 2 h to complete, including instructions 
and all breaks.
Analysis
To verify that participants were actually able to perform 
the main task above chance level, individual performance 
was assessed using a binomial test for each combination 
of prediction-type condition and distractor presence. If the 
accuracy in any of these combinations was not significantly 
higher than expected by chance (α = 0.05), the data of this 
participant were excluded from analysis. Additionally, sev-
eral trials in the action prediction phase had to be excluded 
due to technical issues (error in the program) during data 
acquisition. However, this affected only 2.57% of the trials, 
on average, in this particular condition.
We tested our hypotheses using a 2 × 3 repeated-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on mean accuracies, with 
the factors ‘prediction type condition’ (baseline, cue predic-
tion, action prediction) and ‘distractor presence’ (distrac-
tor absent, distractor present), followed up with individual 
two-tailed paired-samples t tests comparing the cost of dis-
tractor presence on accuracy between prediction type condi-
tions. Of most interest to our first main question—whether 
the distractor would exert a lesser or greater influence on 
search performance when predicted—was the difference 
in distractor interference between the baseline and each of 
the two prediction-type conditions. Our second question—
that is, whether the effect of prediction can be attributed to 
motor-related prediction processes—was examined by ana-
lyzing the difference in distractor interference between the 
two prediction-type conditions. Distractor interference was 
quantified as the difference in accuracy between distractor-
absent and distractor-present trials.
Results
The ANOVA (described above) revealed a significant main 
effect of distractor presence, F(1, 29) = 21.0, p < 0.001, 
휂
2
G
 = 0.048, 휂2
p
 = 0.420: participants exhibited generally lower 
accuracy in the presence of a distractor (M = 0.780, 
SD = 0.075) compared to its absence (M = 0.814, 
SD = 0.077). Follow-up t tests revealed that the distractor 
interference was significant not only in the baseline condi-
tion (95% CI for the difference between means = [0.031, 
0.083], t[29] = 4.449, p < 0.001, dz = 0.812) but also in the 
cue prediction condition (95% CI = [0.0065, 0.045], 
t[29] = 2.743, p = 0.010, dz = 0.501), while being marginal 
in the action prediction condition (95% CI = [− 0.0019, 
0.038], t[29] = 1.85, p = 0.074, dz = 0.339); see Table 2. Fur-
thermore, there was a significant main effect of prediction 
type, F(2, 58) = 3.676, p = 0.031, 휂2
G
 = 0.016, 휂2
p
 = 0.112, see 
Table 2. Importantly for the purpose of the present study, the 
interaction between distractor presence and prediction type 
was significant, F(2, 58) = 4.509, p = 0.015, 휂2
G
 = 0.012, 
휂
2
p
 = 0.135 (see Fig. 2), that is, predictability of the distractor 
did modulate its detrimental influence.
To directly address whether the type of prediction had an 
influence on the reduction of attentional capture, the interac-
tion was followed up with t tests on the size of distractor 
interference (mean accuracy on distractor-present trials 
minus mean accuracy on distractor-absent trials). There was 
a significant difference in the magnitude of distractor inter-
ference (1) between the baseline and the cue prediction con-
dition (95% CI = [0.00032, 0.062], t[29] = 2.07, p = 0.048, 
dz = 0.377), with interference being less marked in the latter 
condition; and (2) between the baseline and the action pre-
diction condition (95% CI = [0.0095, 0.068], t[29] = 2.71, 
p = 0.011, dz = 0.495), again with less marked interference 
in the latter condition—see Table 2. This pattern indicates 
that both kinds of predictive information were effective in 
attenuating distractor interference. However, the difference 
in distractor’s interference between the cue and action 
Table 2  Performance accuracy 
(means and standard deviations) 
for all prediction-type and 
distractor present conditions
M mean, SD standard deviation, N = 30, values represent accuracy, i.e., the proportion of correct responses
Prediction-type 
condition
Overall Distractor absent Distractor present Interference size
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Baseline 0.784 0.078 0.812 0.074 0.755 0.071 0.057 0.070
Cue 0.802 0.071 0.815 0.070 0.789 0.071 0.026 0.051
Action 0.806 0.084 0.815 0.088 0.796 0.079 0.018 0.054
 Psychological Research
1 3
prediction conditions was not significant, 95% CI = 
[− 0.016, 0.031], t[29] = 0.656, p = 0.517, dz = 0.120. Note 
that the predictive information influenced mainly the distrac-
tor-present trials; there was no significant difference among 
the prediction-type conditions for distractor-absent trials 
(F[2, 58] = 0.037, p = 0.963, 휂2
G
 < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.001).
For additional analyses (learning effects, effects of sen-
sorimotor contingencies, and item location and distance 
effects), see the Appendix.
One of our main questions concerns the difference in dis-
tractor interference between prediction based on a cue versus 
an action. Since we did not observe a statistically significant 
difference between these two conditions (p = 0.517), we can-
not make any firm conclusions as to the actual presence or 
absence of the effect. However, we can analyze the likeli-
hood of having obtained a false negative finding, given that 
we had an a priori expectation for the effect size of dz = 
0.546 (Cardoso-Leite et al., 2010). First, our achieved statis-
tical power for an effect of such a size is 0.824, which makes 
the chances of a false negative finding relatively small, 
without, however, eliminating such a possibility. Second, a 
Bayes factor analysis using a Cauchy prior on standardized 
effect size with a recommended scale r = 0.707 to allow for 
a wider range of expected effect sizes (Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) indicated that there is 4.22 
times more evidence for the null hypothesis of no effect.
However, it may simply be the case that the effect is 
smaller than expected or that accuracy was not a sufficiently 
sensitive measure. For this reason, we conducted a follow-up 
experiment which used reaction times as the main dependent 
measure. This follow-up experiment was limited to explor-
ing the currently observed null difference between the cue 
and action prediction conditions, and thereby included only 
the two conditions of interest.
Experiment 2
Methods
Participants
Experiment 2 was conducted at the Istituto Italiano di Tec-
nologia, Genova, Italy. Twenty-eight new participants took 
part, receiving an honorarium for their service. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two action–effect contin-
gency groups as in the first experiment. Furthermore, in each 
group half of participants started with the cue prediction 
condition and the other half with action prediction condition. 
One participant was excluded due to chance-level perfor-
mance. Participants’ age range was 18–31 (M = 25.7) years; 
two were left-handed, and 13 were male. All participants 
self-reported normal or corrected to normal vision.
Written informed consent was given by each participant. 
The study was approved by the local ethical committee 
(Comitato Etico Regione Liguria) and was conducted in 
accordance with the Code of Ethics of the World Medical 
Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data were stored and 
analyzed anonymously.
Procedure
The procedure was generally the same as in Experiment 1, 
though measuring reaction times necessitated a few modi-
fications. In particular, we focused solely on the cue and 
action prediction conditions, presenting them in counter-
balanced order across participants. For this reason, par-
ticipants now also started the exposure trials preceding 
the cue prediction phase by randomly pressing the left 
or right keys, as in the action–effect association phase 
(that preceded the action prediction phase), but the subse-
quently displayed distractor appeared randomly on the left 
or the right side, in order for participants to unlearn any 
action–effect associations they may have had acquired pre-
viously. The second modification related to task response, 
which became speeded. Hence, there was no staircase 
procedure; search displays were presented until response, 
and there were no post-display masks; participants had to 
use two different response options to indicate the target 
probe line orientation as fast and as accurately as possible. 
The search display was again started by a keyboard press 
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Fig. 2  Main results of Experiment 1. Performance accuracy (propor-
tion of correct responses) per prediction type and distractor presence 
conditions. Error bars depict 95% confidence intervals for the mean 
corrected for dependence in measurements (Morey, 2008)
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and the search display appeared after 100 ms. Participants 
issued their target orientation responses by pressing one 
of two foot pedals. Responses were given via foot pedals 
because we deemed it potentially confusing for partici-
pants (and giving rise to interference) had they had to pro-
duce another keyboard response so shortly after initiating 
the trial by a manual key press.
Results
Accuracy was generally at ceiling level; 95% CI for the 
mean of individual accuracies = [0.943, 0.968]. An 
ANOVA on the individual accuracies yielded a signifi-
cant main effect of distractor presence (F[1, 26] = 13.5, 
p = 0.0011, 휂2
G
 = 0.026): slightly more errors were made 
when a distractor was absent rather than present (0.964 
vs. 0.951); critically, however, neither the main effect of 
prediction type nor the prediction type × distractor pres-
ence interaction was significant (both F[1, 26] < 0.8, 
p > .39). Similarly, an ANOVA on the medians of the indi-
vidual reaction times (RTs) revealed a significant main 
effect of distractor presence (F[1, 26] = 63.8, p < 0.001, 
휂
2
G
 = 0.050): RTs were overall slower on distractor-present 
(M = 1168, SD = 244 ms) compared to distractor-absent 
trials (M = 1061, SD = 237  ms). However, neither the 
main effect of prediction type (F[1, 26] = 0.11, p = 0.743, 
휂
2
G
 = 0.0005) nor the prediction type x distractor presence 
interaction (F[1, 26] = 1.06, p = 0.312, 휂2
G
 = 0.0004) were 
significant. See Fig. 3. Including the group factors (order 
of conditions, natural versus reversed action–effect map-
ping) into the ANOVA design did not reveal any additional 
significant (main or interaction) effects. We followed up 
the non-significant interaction of prediction type and 
distractor presence by comparing the distractor interfer-
ence RT costs (RT distractor present minus RT distrac-
tor absent) between the two prediction-type conditions. 
A Bayes factor analysis using Cauchy prior with a rec-
ommended scale of 0.707 yielded modest evidence for 
null effect:  BF01 = 3.03 (Rouder et al., 2009). Finally, we 
conducted an ANOVA on the so-called inverse-efficiency 
scores, computed as median RT divided by accuracy (pro-
portion of correct responses) as a potentially more sen-
sitive, aggregate measure of performance (Townsend & 
Ashby, 1983). However, once again, this analysis yielded 
the same pattern of results, with a significant main effect 
of distractor presence (F[1, 26] = 63.8, p < 0.001), but a 
non-significant main effect of prediction-type and a non-
significant interaction of these two factors (both F < 0.76, 
p > 0.39).
Thus, the follow-up experiment, which employed a 
potentially more sensitive, reaction time measure, likewise 
does not provide evidence in favor of a difference between 
the cue and action prediction conditions.
Discussion
The present study was designed to examine two questions: 
(1) would the opportunity to predict the presence and loca-
tion of an item that is task-irrelevant but attention-capturing 
by means of one’s own actions or by an informative cue 
interfere with task performance to a greater degree, as pos-
ited by the ‘attentional white bear’ hypothesis, or to a lesser 
degree, relative to when no prediction regarding the dis-
tracting item is possible? And (2) would the type of predic-
tive information influence the degree to which the distractor 
interferes with task performance, specifically: is there evi-
dence for a special role of motor stimulus identity prediction, 
as posited by optimal motor control theories, or is non-motor 
identity prediction sufficient for explaining the effect of dis-
tractor predictability on performance?
To examine these questions, we adapted an additional-
singleton compound visual search task. In the first experi-
ment, the search displays were presented only for a limited 
exposure duration and then immediately overwritten with 
post-display masks. Using this task design, we opted for 
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Fig. 3  Results of experiment 2. Mean of individual medians of 
reaction times (a) and mean of individual proportions of correct 
responses (b) for each prediction-type and distractor presence. Error 
bars depict bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the mean
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a measure of distractor interference in terms of accuracy, 
rather than RT, costs, which is arguably better suited to 
capture effects arising at early, perceptual processing stages 
of attentional stimulus selection and discrimination, unaf-
fected by later, post-selective processes of response selec-
tion and execution (Santee & Egeth, 1982). Of note, our 
study is one of only very few that successfully demonstrated 
attentional capture using this type of paradigm and meas-
ure. In the second experiment, display was presented until 
response and reaction times were measured, to examine 
whether the results obtained in Experiment 1 would be gen-
eralizable to another dependent variable, the reaction time 
measure. To address our research questions, we manipulated 
the way in which the presence and location of the distrac-
tor was predicted, namely, by providing participants with 
either an explicit informative external cue or making them 
internally generate a prediction in terms of the anticipated 
effect of a motor action they chose to perform. In all condi-
tions, we controlled for factors such as the presence of an 
action, cognitive load, temporal predictability, and temporal 
control, which are common confounds in other studies on 
action–effect prediction (Hughes et al., 2013), to isolate the 
specific effects of non-motor and motor stimulus identity 
prediction. In this respect, we believe our study to be unique 
in the literature on the potential influences of motor predic-
tion on attention.
In the first experiment, we found that for both prediction 
by an action and prediction by a cue, the distractor interfer-
ence was reduced, compared to a (non-predictive) baseline 
condition. Because our action and external cues provided 
predictive information simultaneously about the presence 
and location of the distractor, future studies are needed to 
disentangle the respective contribution of these two aspects 
of prediction. Of note, the interference reduction was of a 
comparable magnitude whether the distractor was predicted 
by an external cue or by the choice of an action. Predictive 
information of either type about the absence of a distractor 
had no noticeable effect compared to the baseline, suggest-
ing that the prediction indeed influenced the processing of 
the distractor item, rather than the performance improvement 
being due to some other facilitatory processes related to the 
provision of predictive information as such.
Our attempt to capture, as well as possible, any specific 
effects of motor stimulus identity (action–effect) prediction 
came with a methodological cost, namely, presentation of 
the three prediction conditions in a fixed order. In particu-
lar, the action prediction condition had to be administered 
last because of the action–effect association (learning) phase 
that was required for this condition. Implementing this phase 
earlier on in our within-participants design would have influ-
enced any other (i.e., the baseline and/or cue prediction) 
condition(s) participants would have performed after it (e.g., 
pressing the left button in a baseline condition performed 
after the action condition might have attenuated the intensity 
of a stimulus that happened to occur at the location previ-
ously associated with this action). However, our results pro-
vide no evidence that there was a learning effect within the 
three conditions, that is, there was no systematic reduction 
of distractor interference with increasing time on a particular 
task (prediction) condition (see the Appendix and Fig. 4)—
possibly owing to the long exposure to distractors in the 
‘exposure’ (or ‘association’) phase before each condition 
proper and the number of practice (96) and staircase (on 
average 96) trials at the start of the experiment (cf. Müller 
et al., 2009). In addition, across conditions, it is unlikely 
the change in task between the baseline and the cue and 
action prediction conditions as such brought about a step-
like change in performance, due to some factor other than 
the predictive information provided by the cues, such as nov-
elty or increased arousal. First of all, there was no difference 
in performance on distractor-absent trials among the three 
conditions, and for distractor-present trials, any increase 
in general arousal would, arguably, have led to increased 
distractor interference (assuming that arousal would have 
boosted the saliency of the distractor as well as that of the 
target; e.g. Zou, Muller, & Shi, 2012), rather than the reduc-
tion in interference we actually observed.
In any case, we do not believe that our main conclusions 
with regard to the two questions we set out to answer were 
compromised by our sequential condition order. First, our 
results clearly show that distractor prediction did not cause 
an ‘attentional white bear’ (AWB) effect: the AWB hypothe-
sis predicts a performance cost associated with the cues (i.e., 
reduced accuracy on distractor-present trials in the cue- and 
action prediction conditions relative to the baseline), rather 
than the performance benefit that we actually observed. Sec-
ond, optimal motor control theories predict that action–effect 
prediction has a specific, namely, an attenuating effect on the 
predicted stimulus, over and above the effect of cue predic-
tion. However, we failed to find a significantly greater inter-
ference reduction for the action prediction versus the cue 
prediction condition—which may be taken to argue against 
optimal motor control theories (as further discussed below). 
However, despite having evidence favoring the null hypothe-
sis  (BF01 = 4.22), there was a small numerical difference and 
we cannot definitely rule out that self-generated action cues 
may be somewhat more effective in reducing interference 
than external cues (a difference we may have been unable to 
detect with the presented experimental designs and sample 
sizes).
Cue prediction and attentional white bear
With respect to prediction by external cue, participants were 
told they could use the cue information in any way that could 
help them perform the task better. Although most people 
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reported no consistent usage of the information provided by 
the cue (see Appendix), the cue clearly had a positive effect 
on performance for most participants. This indicates that 
the external cue was actually being used by the majority of 
participants, without them being explicitly aware of this, 
perhaps in automatic manner, even without some kind of 
association phase as implemented in the action prediction 
condition. This is consistent with previous reports that peo-
ple can extract cue information without being aware of this 
(Decaix, Siéroff, & Bartolomeo, 2002; Peterson & Gibson, 
2011). A similar case can be made for the action predic-
tion condition, in which participants presumably lacked a 
reason to deliberately and consciously guide their attention 
according to the button they pressed (although participants 
were not explicitly questioned about this at the end of the 
experiment).
Action–effect prediction processes
The difference in performance between the baseline and cue 
prediction conditions was supposed to reveal the influence of 
what Hughes et al. (2013) referred to as ‘non-motor identity 
prediction’ processes, that is, predicting the stimulus (and 
its properties) in a general manner (not necessarily related to 
motor processes). And importantly, any difference between 
the cue- and action prediction conditions was supposed to 
directly reflect the contribution of specific ‘motor identity 
prediction’ processes, in line with optimal motor control-
based theories (Waszak et al., 2012; Wolpert & Flanagan, 
2001). We failed to observe such an additional effect; rather, 
both types of prediction resulted in very similar effects, 
both in terms of the overall interference reduction as well 
as spatial distance effects (see Appendix). While we cannot 
definitely rule out that this null difference is simply a false 
negative finding (owing to lack of statistical power), we did 
achieve a power of 0.82 and 0.78 in our two experiments for 
observing an effect of the expected size and our Bayes factor 
analyses revealed more evidence for the null hypothesis of 
no effect versus the hypothesis of an effect.
Conceivably, our design may have been too different 
from that of Cardoso-Leite et al. (2010) in that instead of 
providing predictive information about a near-threshold 
stimulus our distractor was a highly salient display item. 
Forward model theories postulate that predicted sensory 
consequences of self-generated actions are subject to sen-
sory attenuation, but the specific mechanism bringing about 
this attenuation is unclear. It is possible that such sensory 
signals are attenuated in a non-linear fashion, depend-
ing on the original strength of the stimulus, such that, for 
instance, very salient stimuli cannot be attenuated. How-
ever, Reznik, Henkin, Levy, and Mukamel (2015) found 
that while self-produced supra-threshold auditory stimuli 
were attenuated, near-threshold stimuli were enhanced. If 
their finding generalizes to the visual domain, our salient 
distractor should be subject to sensory attenuation. Another 
nonlinearity, described by Zehetleitner et al. (2013), may 
also make it possible that the sensory strength of the dis-
tractor was actually attenuated by motor prediction, but not 
enough to measurably reduce attentional capture (over and 
above the reduction with external cues). Zehetleitner et al. 
(2013) showed that the probability with which a distractor 
captures attention on a given trial is a psychometric func-
tion of the difference in salience between the distractor and 
the target: if the distractor is much more salient than the 
target, a small decrease in distractor salience—for instance 
due to the presumed attenuation of the sensory consequences 
of self-generated actions—would not translate into any, or 
only a very small, reduction of the probability of attentional 
capture.
Overall, while we cannot exclude existence of a sensory 
attenuation effect for action-specific, motor-identity predic-
tion (Hughes et al., 2013), we observe no evidence in its 
favor in our experiments. We may only speculate that a more 
general mechanism may be engaged in both the action and 
cue prediction conditions. A highly prominent proposal of 
such a general principle is ‘predictive coding’, or, more gen-
erally, ‘predictive processing’ (Clark, 2013) and we there-
fore believe it is worth discussing how our results may fit 
into it.
On this view, only prediction errors are propagated to 
higher levels in a processing hierarchy, and this signal 
should thus be lower for a predicted than an unpredicted dis-
tractor, which could cause sensory attenuation. Importantly, 
the prediction errors are also weighted by their expected 
precision, where this precision weighting is generally taken 
as corresponding to the cognitive-psychological concept of 
attention (Feldman & Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2012). Exactly 
what expected precision should be assigned to a salient but 
task-irrelevant distractor remains an open issue. Multiple 
factors come into play here. It has been proposed that task-
irrelevant stimuli have reduced expected precision (Kok, 
Rahnev, Jehee, Lau, & de Lange, 2012). By contrast, we are 
thought to have a prior expectation (innate or acquired) that 
strong stimuli have a high signal-to-noise ratio and are thus 
more precise (Feldman & Friston, 2010). Arguably, there-
fore, the theory cannot readily answer the critical question 
whether prediction of the distractor would make it more or 
less interfering. What the theory would predict is that both 
cue- and action prediction should influence processing in 
a very similar manner, because both sources of prediction 
have the same accuracy, namely 100%, and also no variabil-
ity in prediction errors—that is, they have the same preci-
sion. However, the theory also allows for a potential addi-
tional effect of action-specific prediction: The principle of 
‘active inference’ posits that we need to decrease the preci-
sion of proprioceptive and somatosensory states to make a 
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movement possible (Brown et al., 2013), though it remains 
unclear whether, how, and to what extent this might also 
concern visual processing.
Note though that our results are merely consistent with 
‘predictive processing’, and it could be objected that this 
framework can accommodate all manners of possible result 
patterns. Despite the promises of this framework, we see it 
as still young and not yet sufficiently developed—especially 
with regard to explaining attentional phenomena (Ransom, 
Fazelpour, & Mole, 2017). Better, and ideally computation-
ally explicit, models are thus required to derive more con-
crete testable predictions. For instance, Kok, Rahnev, et al. 
(2012) proposed a model of how attention interacts with 
prediction in a Posner-type cueing scenario—though their 
model essentially equates attention with task relevance, as 
they consider only prediction of task-relevant information. 
Our data on the interaction of attention and prediction of 
task-irrelevant stimuli might thus be useful for testing future, 
more complete models.
Conclusions
In sum, the present study contributes another piece to the 
growing picture of how prediction by our own actions or by 
environmental (i.e., external) cues can improve attentional 
selection, even in the case of salient, but task-irrelevant dis-
tracting stimuli. Our findings show that both external cues 
and internally generated predictions similarly attenuate the 
negative impact of distracting stimuli on the efficiency of 
attentional selection. However, the data do not support the 
idea of a “special status” of motor-specific predictions play-
ing a role in our experiments. Overall, the pattern observed 
can be explained within the context of the predictive cod-
ing framework, although it does not exclude other theoreti-
cal accounts. This illustrates that attributing effects such as 
sensory attenuation to specific prediction processes (such as 
motor prediction) is methodologically challenging, which 
should be kept in mind when designing experiments on these 
topics and interpreting their results.
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Appendix: Additional Analyses 
of Experiment 1
Learning effects
Because we presented conditions in a fixed sequence, it is 
possible that the improvement in accuracy in the presence 
(vs. the absence) of a distractor could be explained by sim-
ple learning. This would manifest itself as an effect of time 
on the magnitude of distractor interference in at least one 
of the conditions; specifically, interference would decrease 
as a function of time. To examine for such an effect, we 
conducted an ANOVA on interference magnitude (accuracy 
on distractor-absent minus distractor-present trials) with the 
within-participants factor prediction-type condition. Time 
was represented by a numeric within-participants variable 
“block number” (there were 6 blocks of trials in each condi-
tion). While the main effect of prediction-type condition was 
(still) significant (F[2, 58] = 4.52, p = 0.015, 휂2
G
 = 0.0538), 
the main effect of block number was not (F[1, 29] = 0.289, 
p = 0.595, 휂2
G
 = 0.0019), that is, the overall slope of inter-
ference size per block was not significantly different from 
zero; in addition, there was no interaction of block number 
with prediction-type condition (F[2, 58] = 0.235, p = 0.791, 
휂
2
G
 = 0.0036), that is, the slopes do not significantly differ 
between any of the three conditions. See Fig. 4. Although 
this does not rule out that there was some such gradual learn-
ing effect, it alone could not explain the observed reduction 
in distractor interference in the cue and action prediction 
conditions. In addition, we cannot exclude the presence 
of step-wise learning or other similar effects between the 
conditions.
Sensorimotor contingencies
It is possible that the reduction in distractor interference in 
the action prediction condition, rather than being due to the 
learned sensorimotor associations, was actually driven by 
either that half of the participants for whom the mapping 
between actions and effects was “natural” (left key caused 
distractor at top-left location) or the other half with the 
Psychological Research 
1 3
“inverse” mapping (left key caused distractor at bottom-right 
location). To test for this possibility, we performed a mixed-
design two-way ANOVA (on the action prediction condition 
data) with accuracy as the dependent measure, distractor 
presence as a within-participants factor, and contingency 
group (natural versus inverse) as between-participants factor. 
Neither the main effect of the contingency group 
(F[1,28] = 1.407, p = 0.246, 휂2
G
 = 0.043, 휂2
p
 = 0.048) nor, 
importantly, the interaction of contingency group with dis-
tractor presence (F[1,28] = 0.593, p = 0.448, 휂2
G
 = 0.0022, 
휂
2
p
 = 0.021) were significant, although distractor interference 
was numerically lower in the inverse group (M = 0.011, 
SD = 0.047) than in the natural group (M = 0.026, 
SD = 0.060). Therefore, the observed effects in the action 
prediction condition, rather than being sufficiently explained 
by the nature of the action–effect coupling, are more likely 
attributable to the learned sensorimotor contingencies.
With regard to theories proposing an inherent relation 
between action and attentional orienting (e.g., the ‘premotor 
theory of attention’; Rizzolatti, Riggio, & Sheliga, 1994), it 
is possible that it mattered whether the laterality of the (key 
press) action and the distractor location were congruent or 
incongruent. To examine this, we selected distractor-present 
trials that were started by a left- or a right-sided action (i.e., 
we disregarded trials started with a neutral action) and ana-
lyzed them in terms of the factor ‘action-distractor lateral 
congruence’ (‘ipsilateral’ when the side of the distractor was 
congruent with that of the action, and ‘contralateral’ when 
not). Note that for the action prediction condition, this factor 
maps directly onto the factor ‘contingency group’ analyzed 
above (ipsilateral for the natural and contralateral for the 
inverse mapping)—so that it is unsurprising that, again, we 
found no significant difference (F[1, 28] = 2.18, p = 0.151, 
휂
2
G
 = 0.072) between the two groups (ipsilateral distractors, 
M = 0.776, SD = 0.081; contralateral distractors, M = 0.817, 
SD = 0.074). For the baseline and cue prediction conditions, 
although there was an overall numerical difference between 
ipsilateral (M = 0.781, SD = 0.099) and contralateral tri-
als (M = 0.759, SD = 0.080), the main effect did not reach 
significance (F[1, 29] = 1.675, p = 0.206, 휂2
G
 = 0.012) and 
there was no interaction with condition (F[1, 29] = 0.156, 
p = 0.696, 휂2
G
 < 0.001). We conducted an analogous analysis 
for the factor “action-target lateral congruence”. Given that 
in the action prediction condition, pressing the left or the 
right key always led to a distractor-present trial, we first ana-
lyzed only distractor-present trials (in all three conditions) 
per the factors of lateral congruence and prediction type. 
Second, we analyzed both distractor-present and -absent 
trials per action-target lateral congruence and prediction-
type condition, but only in the baseline and cue predic-
tion conditions. None of the main effects and interactions 
involving ‘lateral congruence’ were significant (all F < 0.54, 
p > 0.58). In sum, we found no evidence that the laterality of 
the actions per se influenced attentional selection and per-
formance in our paradigm.
Cue prediction condition
It is important to rule out that in the cue prediction condi-
tion, participants, after seeing a directional cue (left, right, 
or neutral), tended to choose the congruent key to start the 
trial (e.g., press left key when seeing a left cue), so that the 
action would be predictive of the distractor to some degree 
in this condition as well. This did not turn out to be the case: 
there was no association between the cue and the keys par-
ticipants pressed (Χ2[4] = 1.388, p = 0.85), consistently with 
the instructions, see Table 3.
We used a questionnaire to ask participants how they 
think they utilized or were influenced by the information 
provided by the cue. Only three participants reported a con-
sistent influence of the cue (one reported feeling consistently 
captured, mean interference size in the cue prediction condi-
tion = 0.063; two reported that they had tried to ‘look away’, 
0.083 and − 0.042, respectively); 17 participants said they 
had completely ignored the cue (M = 0.024) and the remain-
ing 10 participants reported that they had occasionally 
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Fig. 4  Distractor interference as a function of block (time) for each 
prediction-type condition. Interference magnitude is calculated as 
mean accuracy for distractor-absent minus distractor-present trials. 
There were six blocks (of 32 trials each) in each condition. Error bars 
depict 95% confidence intervals for the mean corrected for depend-
ence in measurements (Morey, 2008)
Table 3  Relative frequencies 
of actions starting the trial per 
cue type in the cue prediction 
condition of Experiment 1. 
Numbers in columns are means 
of individual percentages of 
actions that were produced 
when seeing a given cue type
Cue Key pressed
Neutral Left Right
Neutral 48.6 25.7 25.7
Left 48.3 24.8 26.9
Right 49.6 24.7 25.8
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looked in the direction of the cued location or away from it, 
started to ignore it after a few trials, or were not sure how 
they had used the cue (M = 0.026). Overall, there seems to 
be no clear correspondence between the reports and actual 
interference size.
Distance effects
A variety of studies have reported distance effects in our 
type of paradigm, such as an inhibitory surround around a 
focus of attention (Gaspar & McDonald, 2014; Hopf et al., 
2006; Tombu & Tsotsos, 2008). Hence, as an exploratory 
analysis, we split distractor-present trials according to the 
distance between the target and distractor. Visual inspec-
tion revealed the distance effects to be closely similar in 
the cue and action prediction conditions, as compared to 
the baseline condition (Fig. 5). However, an ANOVA on 
mean accuracies with the within-participants factors pre-
diction-type condition and distance (as a categorical vari-
able) did not reveal any significant effects (main effects: 
both p > 0.15; interaction: F[4, 116] = 1.99, p = 0.10). This 
may be owing to noisy estimates of accuracy at the long-
est distance (7.2°), due to a low number of trials for this 
distance. Visual inspection also suggested lower accu-
racy for targets closest (3.6°) to distractor compared to 
medium distances (6.2°), consistent with the inhibitory 
surround effect. Accordingly, we limited further analysis 
to these two distances (of 3.6° and 6.2°). The correspond-
ing ANOVA revealed the main effect of prediction-type 
condition to be significant (F[2, 58] = 8.75, p < 0.001), 
whereas the main effect of distance only approached sig-
nificance (F[1, 29] = 3.53, p = 0.07) and the interaction was 
non-significant (F[2, 58] = 0.141, p = 0.87). Follow-up tests 
comparing pairs of conditions revealed the main effect of 
prediction type to be present when (separately) compar-
ing the cue prediction and the action prediction conditions 
versus the baseline (F[1, 29] = 13.5, p < 0.001, and, respec-
tively, F[1, 29] = 11.23, p = 0.002), but not when compar-
ing the cue versus the action prediction conditions (F[1, 
29] = 0.13, p = 0.72). We can therefore conclude that pre-
diction improved processing of targets at close-to-medium 
distances from the distractor in a similar way for both types 
of prediction.2
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